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A HURRIED PERSPECTIVE ON THE
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT:
THE MARX BROTHERS ASSAULT
THE CITADEL
MAURICE J. HOLLAND*
It is clear to me that this year's symposium is the main event
for which the previous two meetings were preparatory sparring
matches. On those occasions, we took on the flyweights of the
left, the enervated and dazed liberals, and according to my tally
we scored TKO's both times. This weekend, we are pitted
against the burly heavyweights of the left, the critical legal stud-
ies movement' and its coterie of more or less radical leftist
scholars. I trust we have all done our roadwork and sharpened
up our timing on whatever punching bags are locally available.
.So let us come out fighting and endeavor to strike a few blows
for liberty, which is our cause.
I will pose, and subsequently attempt to answer, the follow-
ing questions: Just what sort of people are we confronting?
Where did they come from and why are they coming at this
particular time? And finally, how can we conservatives most ef-
fectivelyjoin ranks and confront them?
The title I have chosen for this talk suggests that although
'most of the people associated with the critical legal studies
(hereinafter CLS) movement derive their principal inspiration
from that prince among Nineteenth-Century windbags, Karl,
they cannot be wholly understood without at least passing ref-
erence to those princes among Twentieth-Century comics, the
brothers Groucho, Chico, and Harpo.' The CLS crowd shares
the general humorlessness of the left. Their stridency and
heavy-handedness prevent them from attaining anything like
the wit of the Marx brothers, but in some of their writings there
is a Groucho-like propensity for ridiculing the conventions of
bourgeois norms, something that has always gone down very
* Associate Dean, Indiana University School of Law.
1. See generally Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1983).
2. The Marx Brothers were theatrical comics prominent during the 1920s, '30s and
'40s for their combination of vaudeville, burlesque, and satire, and were best known for
their films Animal Crackers (1930), Duck Soup (1933), A Night at the Opera (1935), and A
Day at the Races (1937). See A. EYLEs, THE MARX BROTHERS: THEIR WORLD OF COMEDY
(1966).
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well with the privileged scions of the bourgeoisie. Consider,
for example, the following excerpts from the Lizard (this is from
an article entitled Cultural Terrorism and the Faculty Cochtail
Party):3
The law faculty cocktail party-a trivial occasion, exchange
pleasantries then leave-nothing to do with you. But there's
more to it. It's a political event-a fantasy of community. It's
like people waiting for a bus with people who have been
waiting for the same bus for years, and still just saying good
morning. . . . The group ritual, the rules. Rules assigning
costumes. We're dressed alike because we're a shared pro-
ject, group self-recognition distinct from the bartender's
serving jacket. Proper forks-conversations shot through
with fork selection- don't use curse words, not here, at the
production of group identity. Stylized group interaction
right down to what's said. Hard to remember anything par-
ticular. The weather. Sports. Bullshit about teaching, not se-
rious-that would be work, or politics.Just enough to ensure
the exclusion of the other. Like most of the women there
with faculty husbands. . . . On a spectrum of parties rang-
ing from artist parties and black folks' parties to astronauts'
parties, the faculty cocktail party is real close to how astro-
nauts must party. No music, no conversation where any emo-
tion is at stake, this is the head, not the body, this group is
rational, scientific, not passionate and physical, manager, not
worker; the fantasy of community built on the identification
as scientists so the parties project rationality through and
through, even "socially" because you can't imagine brain
surgeons getting sweaty on the dance floor, it's the
law/politics distinction. Fear and loathing of the mob and
sexuality. This is cultural terrorism. Civility here means ac-
cepting the structure in which civility occurs. Turning law
schools into genuine places for community means smashing
all this stuff. In every crevice. Academic freedom cannot co-
exist with social rape.
You will probably find the quality of this pointed satire some-
thing short of Swiftian. What humor there is in it is not what
the fevered author intended. Not all, however, is sophomoric
fun and games with the CLS crowd. For those of you who may
be unacquainted with the characteristic CLS mindset and mode
of expression, let me give you brief excerpts from two of the
3. The Lizard is a broadside issued by the "True Left Faction" of the CLS movement
devoted to reporting on various doings at the most recent annual meeting of the Asso-
ciation of American Law Schools.
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more earnest effusions. The first is from an essay entitled Torts
by Richard L. Abel:
It would be a mistake to interpret legal phenomena solely in
terms of their instrumental effect upon materials conditions.
Tort law is also significant in the reproduction of bourgeois
ideology. The fault concept upon which that law was built
reinforces a central element of bourgeois ideology: individu-
alism. Predicating liability upon the defendant's fault and
denying recovery because of the victim's fault perfectly ex-
press the bourgeois belief that each person controls his or
her fate. And, indeed, the bourgeoisie experience this con-
trol in their own lives-in their work, their consumption, and
their environment-an experience epitomized in the con-
temporary sauve qui peut obsession with personal physical,
mental, and emotional well-being. . . . Tort law offers sym-
bolic support for inequality as well. By compensating owners
for property damage, it upholds the notion of private prop-
erty and its concomitant, i.e., that a person's worth, as a tort
plaintiff, is proportional to the value of the property he
owns. By preserving the income streams of those who suffer
physical injury, and of their dependents, tort law affirms the
legitimacy of the existing income distribution.4
I take it that the author expects his readers to be scandalized
by the nefarious spectacle of plaintiffs suing for property dam-
age and recovering compensation for the value of the property
damaged. What else, one might ask, should the measure of re-
covery be? Intended to incite equal indignation are the follow-
ing contentions from an essay by Peter Gabel and Jay M.
Feinman:
The recent rise of right-wing forces in the United States has
been brought about in large part through the shaping and
manipulation of collective fantasies. Among the most pow-
erful of these fantasies is a resurgence of what one might call
the utopian imagery of freedom of contract. As Reagan "lifts
the government off of our backs," we are told that we all will
once again be able to stand as free and equal individuals
ready to take whatever action serves our respective self-in-
terests. The image conveys a sudden release of personal
power, as if it had only been "government" that had been
obstructing the realization of our individual desires. At the
same time, the image also conveys a new feeling of social
solidarity, a feeling that once that obstruction is removed, we
Americans will return to a time when a deal was a deal, when
4. Abel, Torts, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 185, 194 (D.
Kairys ed. 1982).
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as plain-speaking people we could hammer out our collec-
tive destiny through firm handshakes enforceable in a court
of law. For this resurgent ideology to enjoy a temporary
measure of success, it makes no difference that it is based
upon a lie. The truth is that those of us living in the United
States today cannot actually achieve our desire for increased
personal power, for freedom, and for genuine social connec-
tion and equality so long as we are trapped within ubiquitous
hierarchies that leave us feeling powerless, alienated from
one another, and stupefied by the routines of everyday
activities.
5
The excerpts are, I think, fairly representative samples of
what passes for scholarship among CLS devotees, though the
best of them are not always given to such leaden, moth-eaten,
Marxist boilerplate. In fact, apart from their shared antipathy
toward American law and society, it is difficult to distill much
that united the sublime if impenetrable abstractions of Roberto
Unger,6 the erudite if tendentious historicism of Morton Hor-
witz,7 the sometimes ingratiating hoydenism a la Chairman
Mao of Duncan Kennedy,$ and the strident doublethink of
others who will go unnamed lest I be accused of resorting to
the arguments ad hominem or adfeminam.
The works of most CLS authors boil down to an oscillation
between, or amalgamation of, the shopworn staples of left lib-
eralism and the moldy tenets of Marxism. A characteristic motif
is a peremptory dismissal of all liberal reforms as "mere tinker-
ing" with a legal and social order that is malignant root and
branch. Inveighing against individualism, which they often re-
fer to as "privatism," they nevertheless profess concern for civil
rights and civil liberties. They are naturally dismissive of prop-
erty rights, tending to view them as means for maintaining
structures of domination and illicit hierarchies.
The Marxist borrowings of the CLS movement tend to savor
more of the early, Hegelian, utopian Marx; the Marx so assidu-
ously magnified by Sidney Hook9 and other social democrats in
5. Gabel & Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE PoLITcs OF LAW: A PROGRES-
SIVE CRITIQUE 172 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
6. See generally Unger, supra note 1.
7. See generally Horwitz, The Historical Contingency of the Role of History, 90 YALE L. J.
1057 (1981).
8. Seegenerally D. KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION HIERARCHY: A
POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983).
9. See generally S. HOOK, REVOLUTION REFORM AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: STUDIES IN THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MARXISM (1975).
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their poignant effort to salvage him from his Leninist reincar-
nation; the pre-Manifesto Marx who waxed lyrical in The German
Ideology about how everyone in the post-revolutionary mil-
lenium would be a fisherman in the morning, a hunter in the
afternoon, a critic after dinner, and a cattle-raiser at night (or,
as Duncan Kennedy would have it, a law professor in the morn-
ing and a janitor in the afternoon). Of course, all of this was
repudiated as romantic nonsense by Marx himself when he
later got down to cases about the necessity for the liquidation
of the bourgeoisie.
Although leftists existed in the legal academy long before the
recent emergence of the CLS movement, there were probably
never more than an isolated handful at any one time. CLSers,
however, differ from their predecessors in several important re-
spects. First, traditional leftist lawyers and law teachers tended
to focus their attention almost exclusively on public law issues.
The CLS scholars, by contrast, are at least as attentive to pri-
-vate as to public law. In fact, one hallmark of their work is their
general rejection of the conventional distinction between the
private and the public spheres.1° More particularly they insist
that American law, in addition to being racist, sexist, and basi-
cally not nice, is but a seamless web of repressive rules and
fraudulent methodological sleight of hand, oppressive to all ex-
cept the few standing at or near the apex of the hierarchical
structures which they claim pervade American society. No rule
or doctrine, however trivial or technical, escapes their baleful
scrutiny for long. I do not know whether articles entitled Last
Clear Chance and Capitalist Expropriation or Keeping Women in their
Place: The Doctrine of Relation-Back of Amendments of Pleadings as a
Tool of Patriarchal Repression have yet appeared, but if not, we
probably do not have long to wait. 1
A second obvious difference is that the CLS movement con-
stitutes a remarkably compact generational cohort. With few
exceptions, it is composed of anti-war, student radicals who,
fifteen years after their halcyon days, are now accoutered with
tenure and other perquisites of a system they affect to despise.
Their acceptance by this system seems only to have heightened
10. See generally Mnookin, The Public/Private Distinction: Political Disagreement and Aca-
demic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429 (1982).
11. See D. KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY
(1983); Abel, A Socialist Approach to Risk, 41 MD. L. REV. 695 (1982); Abel, Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, and Claiming, 15 L. & Soc. REV. 631 (1982).
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their "status anxiety"'12 about demonstrating that they have not
been co-opted by the success-oriented, that they remain pure
of heart and reflexively anti-American.
Thus, their publicly reported political views remain almost
ludicrously tendentious. One would expect to find more bal-
ance and fair-mindedness in Kremlin propagandists. They are
like auditors who take account only of liabilities and debits,
while totally ignoring offsetting assets and credits. In excoriat-
ing the United States for its reactionary alliances, they harp
endlessly on Chile and El Salvador, but never mention the un-
stinting military and economic support our country has given
Israel, which in the kibbutzim, has probably come closer than
any other state to achieving the kind of egalitarian community
the CLS crowd is always prattling about. The nearly incredible
political irresponsibility of these people is largely due to the
fact that the vast majority of them have spent their entire post-
adolescent lives in an academy presided over by endlessly apol-
ogetic, no-enemies-on-the-left liberals with whom regularly tra-
ducing the United States is a sure means of attracting a serious
and fawning following.
There is at least one other important factor which helps to
account for the emergence of the CLS movement over the past
decade. Changes in the academic job market have lured into
law teaching people whose intellectual style and temperament
distinguish them sharply from those who traditionally entered
this field. In the past, nearly everyone who went to law school
did so with the aspiration of becoming a practicing lawyer, or
perhaps a businessman or government official. Law professors
generally regarded themselves as lawyers who happened to
teach, and retained a close sense of identification with the pro-
fession throughout their academic careers. Their scholarship
was largely directed toward the needs and interests of practic-
ing lawyers and judges. Even the most casual perusal of con-
temporary law journal literature, particularly that of journals
and reviews affiliated with the most prestigious universities, will
reveal how much this has changed.
About fifteen years ago, university faculty positions in the hu-
manities and social sciences started becoming extremely scarce.
At about the same time, applications to American law schools
12. See L. TRILLING, BEYOND CULTURE: ESSAYS ON LITERATURE AND LEARNING (1965).
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began to soar, making positions on law faculties plentiful. Many
individuals originally bent on a teaching career in history, phi-
losophy, sociology, or literature went to law school to fulfill
their academic inclinations as law professors.
There is, of course, nothing sinister about this. In fact, the
law school world has been vastly enriched by the influx of peo-
ple well versed in other disciplines. They have been substan-
tially responsible for one of the most fruitful recent
developments in legal education: the proliferation of sound
and rewarding interdisciplinary courses. Not all members of
this new breed of law professors were or are political leftists,
nor are they by any means invariably associated with the CLS
movement.
Many of them are, however, steeped in what Lionel Trilling
some decades ago called the "adversary culture" of American
intellectuals,' 3 a cast of mind and attitude often shared by aca-
demics in the humanities and social sciences, who think of
themselves as intellectuals in the European sense. They dis-
play, almost in the manner of the livery of their vocational
guild, an attitude of contempt and moral superiority toward the
"'business culture" of the United States, toward commerce,
technology, and entrepreneurship, and hence toward the prac-
"ticing bar which they perceive to be in thralldom to these val-
ues and interests. They tend to regard themselves as being
.above serious concern with the mundane practicalities of the
worlds of trade, industry, and finance. In their teaching, and
even more emphatically in their scholarship, there is a marked
proclivity towards highly abstract theorizing and stridently cen-
sorious moralizing. They often display marked frustration with
the earthy, resiliently pragmatic texture of the common law tra-
dition, which has shown a hardy resistance to the assaults of
theoreticians and moralizers over the many centuries since
command of the common law was decisively wrested from the
clergy and the universities by those eminently practical men of
affairs, the benchers and barristers of the Inns of Court.
I will conclude with a few thoughts about how we as conserv-
atives might best respond to the challenge posed by this new
brand of leftism within the legal academy. First, it is vitally im-
portant that we give not even the appearance of espousing the
13. Id.
Holland 245No. 2]
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy
naive and untenable position that the law is one thing and poli-
tics, broadly conceived, wholly another. We, of course, reject
the Marxist contention, which has been adopted by the CLS
movement, that law is indistinguishable from politics and that
courts are nothing but legal arms of the ruling class. But to
pretend that law and politics, in the grand tradition of political
thought, are or should be totally unconnected would only lend
substance to our opponents' caricature of what we stand for.
The very idea that law should be something other than a polit-
ical force is, after all, itself a political idea. It is characteristic of
the leftists to set up a strawman and then claim to have exposed
a hoax when they succeed in knocking it down. One of their
favorite strawmen, constructed out of their misperception of
our position, is the view they attribute to us that law exists and
functions in a kind of aseptic isolation from political values.
Surely no group calling itself the Federalist Society could seri-
ously ascribe to such a view. Rather, we know, as did the Ameri-
can Federalists, that the legal order is shaped by, and draws
sustenance from, political values, not in the narrow and ephem-
eral partisan sense, but in the larger sense of a nation's vision
of the good society and its constituent elements. This is its
glory, not its shame.
Much of socialism's appeal, such as it is, functions on the
level of assertions about politics and morality. If we are not to
be "struck dumb by the least cliches of socialism" (to borrow
William Buckley's phrase), we must be prepared to grasp that
nettle, and not seek refuge in narrow professionalism. In this
respect we are well-girded for the struggle by the inspiring ex-
ample of the American Federalists, many of whom were not
only fine lawyers in the professional sense, but also great prac-
titioners of politics in the most elevated meaning of the term.
Surely they furnish proof, if proof be needed, that lawyers who
are broadly cultivated and well-versed in history and philoso-
phy can think capaciously as well as rigorously, thereby enhanc-
ing their contribution to the times in which they live.
Second, however highly one might esteem the contributions
of the law and economics scholars, conservatives must no
longer leave to them the exclusive task of articulating our case.
We must demonstrate that conservatism stands for a good deal
more than allocational efficiency. As was once said, man does
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not live by bread alone. 14 This seems particularly true in socie-
ties such as ours where an abundance of bread and other
materials things is so often taken for granted. Even successfully
demonstrating that socialist prescriptions would shortly reduce
ours to an Albanian standard of living might not make our case
with those with whom we must make it: the vast majority of law
students and young lawyers who consider themselves neither
radicals nor conservatives. However synthetic their strident
moralizing, we must not abandon the high ground of moral
philosophy to our opponents.
Third, I commend to you a warning given by that great
schoolmaster of all American conservatives, Russell Kirk, that
we beware of what he called the chronic vice of conservatives,
self-serving complacency, which often takes the form of obdu-
rately defending the indefensible.' 5 We must guard against the
natural tendency to react to the extravagant assaults from the
left with extravagant defenses of the status quo, by which we
would become a mirror image of what we oppose. We should
not reflexively deny that there exist in the United States, as in
all nations, occasions of serious injustice, that there are ine-
qualities of condition impinging on equality of opportunity,
and that much suffering and distress have gone unrelieved. Af-
ter all, much of our quarrel with the left concerns how these
shortcomings can best be remedied without sacrificing liberty,
and not the question of whether they should be remedied.
In waging our struggle, we will labor under one important
disadvantage, that of seeming to be in a defensive posture.
Given the times in which we live, the polemic and forensic ad-
vantage always appears to lie with those who are on the attack
and who promise brave new worlds. Against this, however, we
enjoy at least one great advantage: the propositions about law
and the nature of the good society for which we stand do evoke
fortifying resonances from the diverse traditions of this coun-
try. Not the least of these is the legacy of the American Federal-
ists of which this Society has constituted itself a combative
conservator.
14. Luke 4:4.
15. R. KIRK, TiE CONSERVATIVE READER XXiii (1982).
No. 2] Holland 247

